Feel Free Read The Causes of the Panic of 1893 PDF

“Awarded a first prize by the committee appointed by Hart, Schaffner & Marx ... distinguished for minuteness of observation and voluminousness of data.” - The Public: A Journal of Democracy (1907) "Prize-winning ... a convincing application of the 'orthodox view that fear of unsettling the gold standard upsets markets.'" - Progressive Intellectuals and the Dilemmas of Democratic (1997) Professor Lauck’s 1907 prize-winning book “The Causes of the Panic of 1893” is a must read for those interested in frenzies and financial panics throughout history. Not only is his insight helpful to understanding the causes of the 1893 panic, but also in understanding how America was able to develop even with an undependable money supply which seemed to cause frequent problems. In reading this book one can recognize the similarities between 1893 and the subprime collapse of 2008. This book demonstrates that history repeats itself and that modern policy makers often fail to learn from the past or willingly turn a blind eye toward it. In particular, the Argentinian real estate bubble in the late 1880s has many close similarities to the sub-prime bubble in the United States in the mid-2000s. William Jett Lauck (1879-1949) was Associate professor economics and political science, Washington and Lee University, and later Vice chairman American Association for Economic Freedom; in 1907 Lauck published his prize-winning book “The Causes of the Panic of 1893.” Lauck additionally served on several government commissions and committees and as an economist for the United Mine Workers and United Automotive Workers of America. The Panic of 1893 was a serious economic depression in the United States that began in 1893. Similar to the Panic of 1873, it was marked by the overbuilding and shaky financing of railroads, resulting in a series of bank failures. Compounding market overbuilding and the railroad bubble was a run on the gold supply. The Panic of '93 was the worst economic depression the United States had ever experienced at the time. In summing up his work, Professor Lauck writes: “The fundamental and effective cause of the crisis of that year was the fear as to the fixity of the gold standard, or, in other words, the apprehension, which was prevalent both in this country and abroad, that the United States would be unable to maintain the gold standard of payments.”